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Abstract
It is demonstrated that weakening the strong nondic-
tatorship requirement stated by Gibbard and by
Satterthwaite enables the construction of strategy-proof
choice mechanisms by shifting the difficulties from the
phase of choice mechanism construction to the phase of
agenda formation.
Ever since Arrow (1963), Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)
proved their famous impossibility results, the relation between
Arrow's required axioms for social welfare functions and Gibbard' s and
Satterthwaite 's stated axioms for strategy-proof choice mechanisms has
attracted a great deal of attention. Satterthwaite (1975) used his
(and Gibbard's (1973)) results on the impossibility of constructing
strategy-proof, nondictatorial choice mechanisms to re-prove Arrow's
(1963) impossibility theorem on constructing nondictatorial social
welfare functions. Blin and Satterthwaite (1978) proved that when
preferences are unrestricted the existence of a social welfare func-
tion that satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives and
monotonicity conditions implies the existence of strategy-proof choice
mechanisms. Maskin (1976) correctly observed that to prove complete
equivalence between the two problems one must show equivalence on any
given domain of restricted preferences. He gives an example (see also
Muller and Satterthwaite (1983)) of a restricted domain of preferences
that permits the construction of a nondictatorial strategy-proof choice
mechanism but not the construction of an Arrow type social welfare
function, thus refuting complete equivalence. He goes on to prove, as
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did Kalai and Muller (1977), the equivalence over restricted domains of
preferences of the class of Arrow type social welfare functions with
the class of rational strategy-proof choice mechanisms. For this pur-
pose they used a weaker notion of nondictatorship as a requirement for
choice mechanisms than the nondictatorship condition used by Gibbard
and by Satterthwaite. Blair and Muller (1983) replaced the nondic-
tatorial requirement used by Maskin and by Kalai and Muller with the
stronger requirement of essentiality, and they proved the equivalence
over restricted domains of preferences of the class of essential Arrow
type social welfare functions with the class of rational, essential
strategy-proof choice mechanisms. This body of research was summarized
and discussed in detail in Muller and Satterthwaite (1983) and is an
excellent reference for the interested reader.
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that if the nondic-
tatorial condition postulated by Gibbard (1973) and by Satterthwaite
(1975) is replaced with the weaker nondictatorial condition required by
Maskin (1976), Kalai and Muller (1977), Ritz (1983) and others, then it
is possible to construct choice mechanisms which possess all the
required properties. These mechanisms depend heavily on the agenda at
issue. Thus the difficulties with strategy-proof choice mechanisms
shift from the choice mechanism construction phase to the agenda for-
mation phase.
Notations and Definitions
The notations and definitions used here follow those in Kalai and
Muller (1977) and Muller and Satterthwaite (1983). Let N = {l,...,n}
be a set (society) of n individuals or agents (|n| > 2). Let A denote a
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finite set of feasible alternatives (|a| > 2), and let E denote the set
of all transitive antisymmetric complete binary relations on A. (For
the sake of brevity the discussion is restricted to the case of strict
preferences only.) An element of Z is called a preference relation.
Let ft be a nonempty subset of Z; ft is the set of all the admissible
preference relations in the society and referred to as the restricted
domain of preferences, ft represents the set of all n-tuples of
preferences from ft, and element of ft , P = (p,,...,p
n
) is called an
n-person profile . An n-person social welfare function (SWF) or ft
is a function f:ft *£• The following are a number of properties a
SWF f may possess.
Unanimity : For every P in ft and x,y in A, if xp.y for i = l,...,n
then xf(P)y.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (11A) : For any x,y in A and
P,Q in ft if [xp.y if and only if xq.y for i i,...,n] then [xf(P)y if
and only if xf (Q)y]
.
Weak Nondictatorship ; There is no individual i in N such that
f(P) = p. for every P in ft .
Essentiality : For every individual i in N there exists a P in ft and
q. in ft and a pair of alternatives x,y in A such that xf(P)y and
yf(P/q
i
)x (P/q
i
= (p
{
,
. . .
,pi _ 1 f q ± ,p i _ 1
, .
. . ,p
n
)) .
Let II be the set of all nonempty subsets of A. II is the set of
all possible agendas. An n-person choice mechanism is a function
F:ft xII+A.
The following is a list of properties a choice mechanism may possess
Feasibility : For every B in H and every P in ft , F(P,B) is in B.
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Unanimity (Pareto Efficiency) : For every P in ft and every B in II, if
x,y in B and xp.y for i = 1,2, ...n then y * F(P,JB).
Independence of Nonoptimal Alteratives (INQA) : For every P in ft and
every B in II, if D C B and F(P,B) in D then F(P,D) = F(P,B).
Manipulability : There exists a B in n, P,Q profiles in ft such that
for some individual i, p. * q . , for every individual k * i, p, = q, and
F(Q,B)p .F(P,B) . F is said to be strategy-proof (or nonmanipulable ) if
it is not manipulable.
Rationality : There exists f, a social welfare function such that for
every B in I and P in ft
n
,
F(P,B) = max
fi
(f(P)).
Mono tonicity : For every feasible set B in n and any element x in
B, whenever (i) two profiles P,Q in ftn aSree on the set B"{ x }> and
(ii) xp.y implies xq.y for all y in B-{x}, then F(P,B) = x implies
F(Q,B) = x.
Weak Nondictatorship : No individual i in N exists such that, for all
feasible sets B in II, F(P,B) = max_.(p.) for all P in ft (maxD (p.) is
a 1 o l
the alternative in B most preferred in p.).
Full Agenda Nondictatorship : No individual i in N exists such that
F(P,A) = max.(p.) for all P in ftn .A 1
Strong Nondictatorship : No individual i in N exists such that, for at
least one feasible set B in I, (|B| > 2) F(P,B) = maXgCp^ for all P in
Essentiality : For every individual i in N there exists a feasible set
B in II, a profile P in ft and a preference q. in Q such that
F(P,B) ± F(P/q.,B).
Thus, a choice mechanism is weakly nondictatorial if no individual
has decisive powers over all possible agendas, it is full agenda non-
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dictatorial if there exists no individual who always possesses deci-
sive powers when the largest possible agenda is considered, and it is
strong nondictatorial if no individual exists that has decisive powers
on even one possible agenda.
In the following representation we emphasize the different notions
of nondictatorship used by Arrow (1963) and by Gibbard and
Satterthwaite (1975).
Result 1 (Arrow (1963))
If |a| > 3 and preferences are unrestricted (JJ = E) , then a social
welfare function f cannot simultaneously satisfy unanimity, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives and weak nondictatorship.
Result 2 (Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975))
If |a| > 3 and preferences are unrestricted (ft = E) , then a choice
mechanism cannot simultaneously be strategy-proof and satisfy unanim-
ity and strong nondictatorship.
Maskin (1976) and Kalai and Muller (1977) in their discussions of
the equivalence between classes of strategy-proof choice mechanisms
and Arrow type SWFs over restricted domains of preferences, relaxed the
original requirement of strong nondictatorship postulated by Gibbard
and Satterthwaite, and used instead the weak nondictatorship require-
ment. The same assumption is used in Ritz (1983) for the case analyzed
there. (In the following representation of the results derived by
Kalai-Muller and Maskin, we omit the part that deals with the charac-
terization of the restricted domains of preferences.)
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Result 3 (Kalal and Muller (1977), Maskin (1976))
For n > 2 the following two statements are equivalent for every CI.
1. Cl permits the construction of an n-person weakly nondic-
tatorial, rational choice mechanism that is strategy-proof and also
satisfies unanimity.
2. CI permits the construction of an n-person weakly nondic-
tatorial social welfare function that satisfies unanimity and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives.
The difficulty in implementing stronger nondictatorship require-
ments for choice mechanisms is demonstrated by the following trivial
example
.
Let A = {a,b,c}, N = {1,2,3} and CI = {p ,p~} such that ap bp.c and
ap,cp,b. Let's define a social welfare function f as follows: for
3
every x,y in A and P in CI , xf(P)y if and only if the majority in N
prefers x to y. Clearly f satisfies unanimity, independence of irrele-
vant alternatives and is weakly nondictatorial. On the other hand, any
choice mechanism F that satisfies unanimity will choose for any P in
3
CI , F(P,A) = a, thus every agent in N is a full agenda dictator. This
demonstrates that the problem of how choice mechanisms satisfying the
original requirements of Gibbard and of Satterthwai te relate to nondic-
tatorial SWFs is still an open one. Blair and Muller (1983) replaced
the weak nondictatorship requirement with the requirement that every
agent will have some decision powers— the essentiality requirement,
and they proved:
Result 4 (Blair and Muller (1983))
The following two statements are equivalent.
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a. The domain Q permits the construction of n-person essential,
monotonic Arrow type social welfare functions.
b. The domain ft permits the construction of n-person rational,
essential and strategy-proof choice mechanisms.
They also demonstrated that the largest restricted domain of pref-
erences that admits essential, rational, strategy-proof choice mecha-
nisms is the domain with "inseparable pair" defined in Kalai and Ritz
(1979), which is of size | A | ! / 2 + (|A|-1)!. Kim and Roush (1981)
demonstrated that this is also the largest restricted domain that per-
mits the construction of stragety-proof , rational, weakly nondic-
tatorial choice mechanisms which also satisfy unanimity. Muller and
Satterthwaite (1983) observe that the question of the maximal size of
a domain that admits weakly nondictatorial , strategy-proof choice
mechanisms which are not necessarily rational, is still an open
question.
In Kalai and Muller (1977), Maskin (1976), Blair and Muller (1983),
Ritz (1983) and other works, the relaxation of the strong nondic-
tatorship condition to the weak nondictatorship condition was con-
sidered an acceptable modification. Here we will demonstrate that if
the weak nondictatorship property is indeed considered to be a proper
replacement for the strong nondictatorship property among the original
properties defined by Gibbard and by Satterthwaite, and no additional
requirements are specified, then it is possible to construct such
choice mechanisms.
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Theorem 1
For every society N of at least two agents and every set of alter-
natives A of at least two alternatives, when preferences are
unrestricted there exist strategy-proof choice mechanisms that satisfy
unanimity and weak nondictatorship.
Indeed, it is even possible to replace the weak nondictatorship
requirement with the essential requirement and still prove that:
Theorem 2
For any society N of at least two agents and every alternative set
A of at least two alternatives when preferences are unrestricted,
there exist essential, strategy-proof mechanisms that also satisfy
unanimity.
The following trivial corollary answers the question posed in
Muller and Satterthwaite (1983).
Corollary 1
The largest domain admitting essential (therefore also weak nondic-
tatorial) strategy-proof choice mechanisms is of size |A|!
It is enough to prove theorem 2.
Proof (of Thereom 2)
Let us define a choice mechanism F as follows. Choose two alter-
natives a,b in A. Then for any P in ft and B in H: if B # {a,b,}
then F(P,B) = max (p ); if B = fa,b} and (i) n is odd, then F(P,B) is
the alternative preferred by the majority of all the agents in N; (ii)
n is even but n > 2, then F(P,B) is the alternative preferred by the
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majority among agents 2,3,...,n; (iii) n = 2 then F(P,B) is the alter-
native preferred by the majority among agents 1,2 and the preference p ,
where ap. t>.
The proof that F is well defined, is essential and strategy-proof,
and also satisfies unanimity can be derived easily and is omitted.
Q.E.D.
It is easy to verify that F is not a rational choice mechanism,
which explains its sensitivity to changes in the agenda at issue.
The above results do not eliminate the existence difficulties with
choice mechanisms. Rather these results demonstrate that by a proper
selection of requirements for strategy-proof choice mechanisms, the
difficulties can be kept either internal to the choice mechanism or
external to it. By requiring either strong nondictatorship, full
agenda nondictatorship, or weak nondictatorship and rationality— the
difficulties are in the possibility that agents may take advantage of
the specified choice mechanism and will misrepresent their preferences.
This is a difficulty internal to the choice mechanism. On the other
hand, if only weak nondictatorship is required, the difficulties are in
how to decide on the agenda, prior to the choice process. Clearly,
different agendas may give the decisive powers to different agents in
society. This can be considered as a difficulty external to the choice
mechanism. The difficulties in establishing an agenda are widespread
and well known. For example, the president of the United States has
the powers to decide on limited military operations, while he needs
the approval of Congress to wage war. The difficulty is then, as was
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cl eraonst rated on a number of occasions, to decide whether an operation
is of limited scale or an act of war.
The results derived in this note suggest an interesting direction
of research in the investigation of mechanisms that both select agen-
das and choose outcomes out of these agendas.
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